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ABSTRACT
The evolving nature of warfare has been changing with cybersecurity and the use of advanced
biotechnology in each aspect of the society is expanding and overlapping with the cyberworld. This
intersection, which has been described as “biocybersecurity” (BCS), can become a major front
of the 21st-century conflicts. There are three lines of BCS which make it a critical component of
overall cybersecurity: (1) cyber operations within the area of BCS have life threatening consequences
to a greater extent than other cyber operations, (2) the breach in health-related personal data is a
significant tool for fatal attacks, and (3) health-related misinformation campaigns as a component
of BCS can cause significant damage compared to other misinformation campaigns. Based on the
observation that rather than initiating the necessary cooperation COVID-19 helped exacerbate the
existing conflicts, the authors suggest that BCS needs to be considered as an essential component
of the cyber doctrine, within the Defending Forward framework. The findings are expected to help
future cyber policy developments.
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INTRODUCTION
The discussion of the evolution of cyber warfare requires the discussion of the consequences in
terms of their impacts. One analysis of papers found that between 2010 and 2020, the notion of
cyber attacks has been normalized and that in some articles, civilian losses go unmentioned, if not
downplayed, despite the compared impact of tools employed (Sallinen, 2021). This indicates that
the effects of cyberwarfare and cyber weapons in security studies may underestimate biological
casualties when taking into account past or possible consequences of cyber conflict versus the impact
on targeted facilities. Throughout the history of warfare, humans have witnessed countless modes
of weaponry from rocks to nuclear warheads of which each advancement has raised the stakes and
risks in engagement in direct losses, making cyberwarfare, which has been seen by the lay public
in a largely computational lens, seem benign. The exception, of course, is within cases concerning
ransomware and news regarding the targeting of public infrastructures such as hospitals or connected
spaces (Martin et al., 2017; Spence et al., 2018). This view is not rare in consideration of modern
DOI: 10.4018/IJCWT.2021070102
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cyber conflicts between rival powers as losses are primarily incurred in terms of financial loss,
infrastructure functionality, corruption of data, and dismantling of logistics, and more, resulting in
the reduction of direct human casualties that would be caused through use of munitions (Brenner and
Clarke 2009; Evans, 2020; Metzger 2020; Moreno and Lovaas 2020; Sallinen, 2021).
In delineating the difference between cyberwar and cyber-crime, as they are sometimes used in
similar instances, a core difference lies in state sponsorship or linked infrastructure of the attacks,
combined with or otherwise operationally linked to armed force (Maurushat, 2013).For example,
Nation A sending criminals to Nation B can be seen as hostile while not being engaged in warfare.
Alternatively, for Nation A to send a battalion of soldiers would be almost unequivocally seen as
warfare. The contexts of each action will differ. It is difficult to put an exact number on what number
of troops or which actions elevate hostilities to war-time actions, and it is reasonable to believe that
the exact number will be nebulous as the exact manpower to constitute an act of war would depend
on particulars and rationale of the nations involved for such an action. As some nations engage in
acts without fully declaring war, enlarging the frame for cyberwar in contexts in which nation-states
utilize cyber attacks in an organized manner as a part of war-time or war-time adjacent acts is helpful
for discussion and may reflect a helpful measure of defense. In the midst of conflicting literature, the
authors lean towards Brenner’s (2006) cyberware definition which reflects virtual conduct of military
operations as they sufficiently ground the context of warfare (Brenner, 2006). Otherwise, such hostile
acts, unconnected to state-actors and armed conflict, can be framed as cybercrime.
DIGITALIZATION OF BIOLOGY AND HINTS OF POSSIBLE ATTACKS
Despite this delineation, it is possible that the line between cybercrime and cyberwar may yet still find
itself blurred through the overlap of the domain of biology, given biology’s increasing digitalization
and versatility of access. Vast research has demonstrated that health can be personalized, and aspects of
it can be digitalized, allowing increasing access to human lives directly and presenting increased risk
(DiEuliis et al, 2018; Berger et al, 2019). Threats to life at this intersection are quite a few for now, but
may soon be found on the increase. A hint was given in September of 2020, wherein it was believed
that a German patient was a fatality due to a ransomware attack. However, this later proved not to
be the case, and the patient was in critical enough condition that the fatality was inevitable (Goodin,
2020; O’Neill, 2020). This, however, highlights the possibility of the case and suggests it as being a
matter of when, not if, a ransomware attack can cripple hospital functions enough to cause a fatality.
Considering the increase in ransomware utilized, it is relatively uncommon for lay people to think of
the deaths that can occur in such cyber attacks, but this is can change (Habibzadeh et al, 2019). There
is good reason to believe that bridging the digital world and biology can be further abused, and for this
reason, the authors see it important discuss the emerging discipline that addressed this intersection
cyberbiosecurity (Murch et al., 2018; Peccoud et al., 2018). For this paper, the authors alternatively
refer to it as biocybersecurity (BCS), emphasizing the biological factors, such as physical elements
like DNA or contextualized information about them in digital form, that can be used and targeted as
an interlock in critical systems reliant on biometrics for authentication or processing, like hospitals.
In time, cyber means can be used to select and attack demographics of populations with precision,
targeting specific biological materials and qualities, from repositories in hospitals, private companies
that amass citizen data, and/or personal devices. The exploitation of BCS, if performed on behalf of
a nation-state, increases the potential for destruction in what could be called biocyberwarfare, that
is, the exploitation of intersectional vulnerabilities in BCS as or accompanying the use of force for
war-time, geopolitical gain.
What this means for the everyday individual is that aspects of modern society that are vital for
everyday living such as agriculture, healthcare, fashion, policing, and energy may become new targets
for exploitation from a new angle of attack: cyber attacks with a biological interlock (Baker et al,
2019; Duncan et al, 2019; George, 2019; Mantle et al, 2019; Potter and Palmer, 2020). Anyone who
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is creative enough, from the individual level to the state-level, and is endowed with the resources to
leverage BCS vulnerabilities may in time beable to modify specific biological components, interface
them with a computer system, and the effects of this can be magnified for actors as biocomputing
and bio-based storage gain increased prominence (Katz, 2015; Goni-Moreno and Nikel 2019; Wang
et al. 2019). It is worth emphasizing that state-actors are much more capable, but their level and
funding are increasingly less a limiter for bio-based attacks given the increasing accessibility of
biotechnology. This potential reflects that the assets susceptible to these attacks must be defended,
and the necessity of the defense will only increase over time. This does not bode well for efforts
of providing adequate national cyber defense, given that many countries are struggling to address
current gaps in their cyber defenses.
JUSTIFICATION OF BCS AS ALTERNATIVE TO
“CYBERSECURITY IN THE HEALTHCARE SECTOR”
Mild critique may exist with respect to the use of BCS versus referring to such matters as simply
cybersecurity within the healthcare sector, but the authors support BCS/CBS as its own field as with
many authors who have put in deep work in establishing the field (DiEulis et al., 2018; Murch et al.,
2018; Peccoud et al., 2018; Richardson et al, 2019; Schabacker et al, 2019; Potter and Palmer, 2020;
Turner, 2019). The authors in this paper posit three chief, but not limiting points, which are that:
•

•
•

A: The increased inclusion of biology as interlocks or foundational units in computational
and otherwise cyber processes limits the role and rationale for keeping IT centered. Example
technologies within the domain are: Biometric authentication, DNA-based computation and
data storage, digitalization of medical records and gesture-based entry, and Brain-Computer
Interfaces, and more are on the way (DiEulis et al., 2018; Murch et al., 2018; Peccoud et al.,
2018; Potter and Palmer, 2020).
B: Many biological processes are no longer simply the end result of data processing and require
specialized training quite distant from IT training to troubleshoot adequately. Further, many of
these processes are not exclusive to healthcare. (Dieuliis et al, 2018; Potter and Palmer, 2020)
C: BCS addresses a temporal matter in that biological processes are taking over aspects of digital
aspects in many emerging technologies, and traditional interfaces are likely not remain -- that is,
BCS better describes the direction of shifting the center of the foundation of these technologies,
which are nowhere, in development, and or are in conceptualization.

Together, these points motivate the authors to move the centering of the topic from cybersecurity
towards the intersection of the fields of cybersecurity, cyber-physical security, and biosecurity while
emphasizing the lead or primacy that exists in biology as traditional means of conceptualizing IT
become less relevant.
BCS AND DEFEND FORWARD
It is also fair to ask where the US stands with its cyber defense strategy as biology increasingly
comes into consideration (Hester, 2019). Currently, the US is undergoing a shift from a defensive to
an offensive stance in what is referred to as “Defending Forward” (DF), as is exemplified in the 2018
Department of Defense (DoD) Cyber Strategy, which states that the DoD “will defend forward to
disrupt or halt malicious cyber activity at its source, including activity that falls below the level
of armed conflict.” The scope of this strategy has been explained by Kosseff with “three general
components: (1) positioning to degrade cyber operations; (2) warning to gather information about
threats and inform defenses; and (3) influencing adversaries to discourage them from deploying cyber
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operations against the United States.” (Kosseff, 2019). The first component “positioning” is a most
critical component and the case for its legitimacy under international law is based on equivalency of
an intrusive positioning to the battlefield preparation in conventional warfare (Chesney, 2018). An
immediate and persistent engagement between the US and its adversaries in cyberspace remains, but
grounding positions pose a difficulty. For example, once an IP address is determined to be the source
of malicious activity on DoD networks, establishing a posture to be able to degrade adversarial actions
is considered a legitimate activity. However, there exist many questions within the DF framework.
For example, it is worth asking to what degree entities such as the DoD ought to conform malicious
intent before acting in cyberspace or a bio-cyberspace as it develops. The bio-cyberspace differs
from cyberspace in that it includes a direct connection to physical, biological components. Further,
it is important to ask what basic security protocols should be within a Defend Forward stance in
the future, which is increasingly biological. Plainly, what does DF mean to BCS? In this article, the
authors aim to explore, but not definitely, possible answers to such questions in light of COVID-19
and other health-related paradigms. The authors do this through discussion of how COVID-19 fits
within the paradigm of BCS, how BCS may open further difficult to predict routes of attack based
on our current defensive frameworks, why biocyberwarfare may become attractive, a case for Defend
Forward, how DF can be augmented through the inclusion of BCS, and projections of both BCS and
DF working at the operational level. However, to note, the sheer breadth and novelty, and need for the
development of the latter, a comprehensive framework of BCS and DF, restricts discussion of such
an exploration. Thus, the authors aim to open discussion within the course of this work.
HOW COVID-19 FITS WITHIN THE PARADIGM OF BCS
The meaning of cybersecurity during the COVID-19 pandemic is multifaceted and is a proper
question of the growing field of BCS. To reiterate from above, Murch et al. (2018) describe this
new and hybridizing field as one wherein security relating to cyber-physical systems, biosecurity,
and general cybersecurity meet. Peccoud et al. (2018) rightly support this by identifying how cyberphysical processes are inherent in biotechnology workflows. As COVID-19 is being addressed by
biotechnological equipment, research is being protected through cybersecurity protocols to protect
from sabotage and espionage, and this makes COVID-19, by extension, a matter of BCS and thus
cybersecurity, as it exists within the heart of biosecurity. Many security professionals previously
considered just the cyber aspect of vulnerabilities posed concerning healthcare, but they have been
recently given reason to think of how biology can play a role as well (Murch et al. 2018). That is, how
can people use aspects of biology to produce physical or cyber-attacks, or how can cyber securitybased exploits be used to thwart biologics-based efforts such as medical relief efforts or testing. From
the cybersecurity side, this can come in the form of people producing phishing campaigns under the
guise of COVID-19 testing or related economic relief, people stealing vital research from labs aiming
to either study COVID-19 or produce vaccines to COVID-19, or simple stalling or disruption of
vaccine logistics. Another route could be through the overwhelming hospital systems, to the degree
that overrides concerns of pre-existing conditions in current medical records; this would not be much
different from a DDoS attack, except in physical form. An already demonstrated path with CT-Scans,
but not yet adapted for COVID-19 shows that one can simply install malware which can produce
false positives and negatives on machines; hypothetically, one may find an adaptation created for
Covid-19, wherein electronic tests could be rigged to give false results and improperly triage infected
patient (Mirsky, 2019). One more route could be through biomimicry via malware which mimics
Covid-19 pathology.For example, Davis (2020) highlighted a route in which a hypothetical malware
with bahvioral qualities like Covid-19 could be effective. Such malware could have at least two
versions, where in an asymptomatic minority variant is benign while others wreck havoc on infected
computing systems (Davis, 2020). This does not yet address the physical and biological, yet cyber
route of attack which is unconventional, but these, themselves, could prove effective. A combination
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of these could be used to product chaos within another nation without firing a single shot, giving
emphasis to teams skillful behind the keyboard. As Xie (2020) notes, it COVID-19 gives reason to
reconsider cybersecurity and the new normal which it may present. However, changes addressing
just convential and marginally new avenues of attacks may fall short in BCS.
BCS’S POSSIBILITY OF OPENING FURTHER LESS
PREDICTABLE ROUTES OF ATTACK
Marushat (2013) noted unconventional cyber attacks, utilized across the world since the 1980s, from
examples such as WANK to STUXNET, and that intrusions have evolved. The value in the effectiveness
of unpredictable attacks, coupled with the evolving nature of attacks, lends the question of where
the next wave of attacks may emerge. As Maurushat (2013) presented, security may be through
obscurity or, its replacement, through absurdity. The flip side is that such an approach can also refer
to exploits of vulnerabilities. The notion of absurd vulnerabilities which made the route of biology
more relevant came through the work of Ney (2017), as his team demonstrated that the use of DNA
in a remote attack, through which synthetic DNA could be used to deliver malware to a computer
system via a sequencing utility. This attack was novel at the time in that it signaled that bio to digital
attacks were possible, and other researchers have since investigated other bio-related avenues, be it
hacking, such as the feasibility of hacking DNA in supply chain systems or means that might take
one-day bridge research that allows for smarter means of hacking such as direct data transfer to cells
or undermining bio-inspired security in the future (Bitam et al, 2016; Berezow, 2021; Gent, 2021).
Additional evolutions might be seen, depending on the continued growth of biotech paired with the
ingenuity of hackers, but the extent is unclear.
COVID-19 may yield a clue to one continued branch in absurd exploits. Already through it,
widespread travel, trade, and relations have been disrupted, and for a good reason. COVID-19 targets
multiple tissues and organs, allowing for an embedding in multiple areas of one’s body and present
symptoms that can last at least months as noted by Fraser (2020). Similar to an infected computer in a
network, just one person carrying this biological virus is a pathway to attacking an entire community
(Rothrock, 2020). Additional variants, which may hamper vaccination development and distribution
efforts, also exist (Koyama et al, 2020). With reflection on how biotechnology costs have been dropping
and accessibility has been increasing, it is possible that COVID-19 could be modified into fiercer
threat through malicious tampering via the work of clever, malicious actors who might one day use
increasingly accessible equipment to amplify its effect. This can mean tweaking of COVID-19 itself
or an analogue, though commonly accessible open-sourced software combined with more easily
accessible DIY biology equipment, to produce a variant that is capable of either confounding the
results of testing or increasing hospitalizations. Althernatively, they could then use this pervasive
virus or variants as a new interlock for attacks on the efficacy of facilities such as hospitals or policing
centers or as a means of injecting malicious code. To restate and refocus, this threat could come
through the work of a malicious actor who creatively uses COVID-19 as a biological interlock within
an attack on a facility, building on prior work with the understanding that an infected individual or
their samples may be processed and be the needed means of delivery.
The tools for the manipulation of genetic material are easily accesible, cheap, versatile, and have
been available for several years (Belhaj et al, 2015; Caplan et al, 2015). Use of such tools, like Crispr,
are now a matter of art in some circles, and these tools are widespread enough that the ability to
stop their profileration or use is unrealistic, not that they should be, especially since citizen scientists
within this domain can be instrumental in assisting in matters of biosecurity and education and
have established modes of governance that are important for understanding and guiding community
embrace of biotechnology (Dumitriu and Goldberg, 2019; Kuiken, 2016; Pearlman, 2017; Thomas
et al, 2017). However, Gronvall and West (2020) note that the potential for malicious use of gene
editing remains; and noting this, continued cooperation with all users of this class of technology
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is essential. Governments will need the means to protect against emergent threats that can arise
through the use of these tools, and to that end, the meaning of cybersecurity during the COVID-19
pandemic is essentially a chance to evolve, think, and dream bigger for what cybersecurity needs to
be. It will also require greater degrees of cooperation between governments and citizens. Government
organizations have success through their outreach to DIY Biohackers, but this success has not been
universal, as noted by Wolinsky (Wolinski, 2016). If these attitudes remain incongruous worldwide,
it is perhaps time for a rethink in efforts to addressing BCS frameworks. Weil and Murugesan (2020)
point out that resilience is possible, and much can be learned from IT, which has and continues to
facilitate many industries and activities disrupted by COVID-19. However, this may only continue as
an intersectional policy focused on preparedness, effective responses, and honest critiques combined
with growth are allowed unabated.
CONSIDERATIONS ON THE PREFERABILITY OF CYBER
WARFARE AND THUS BIOCYBERWARFARE
It is helpful to consider the advantages that countries can gain from opting for cyberwarfare versus
conventional means of warfare. Daggett (2010) noted that the cost of US military campaigns has risen
over time (Daggett 2010). When accounting for the costs of troop deployment as well as the economic
manpower denied through it, these costs can prove unattractive for modern nations to match. Costs rise
substantially through consideration of troop quality of life and their families back home. From there,
moral costs mount considerably and at a higher rate compared to a focused cyber warfare campaign.
Economic losses from munitions left on battlefields and disrupted lives can further multiply costs. In
contrast, a viable and protracted cyberwar campaign can easily be constrained to a much less amount.
This means that destruction can be achieved with and limited to relatively cheap computers and other
electronics connected to the internet, to attack from as far as an internet connection will allow an
agent’s devices to reach. Losses and costs can be cut considerably, and a decent cyberwarfare wing
can disrupt and delay a significant military force through attacking communications and logistics,
allowing for effective multi-pronged means of deterrence (Brantly 2018). For this reason, countries
that are outclassed militarily by larger and more developed powers like Russia and the United States
can engage in asymmetric warfare on new terrain economically by pursuing cyber warfare. This
greater ease in assembling teams and carrying out attacks by countries points to a need for greater
cyber defense to secure information at even the most basic levels. This can entail learning commonly
safe cybersecurity practices such as improved password selection and discouraging downloading
unverified apps for their smartphones. Analogously, similar levels of scrutiny may be needed at the
biological level in consideration of threats within BCS, not just in labs but outside, as biologics takes
increased prominence in society (Peccoud et al. 2018).
In addition to the cost and capability associated with cyber warfare, the scope of active measures
has also expanded with the increasing prominence of the biological component of cybersecurity.
In addition to the traditional active measures, health-related information, propaganda on nations’
responses to the pandemic have become part of Russian active measures. Information about biologics,
true and false, have been used to affect the public mood and create potential openings among the
public to exploit, leading to a potential need for nations to examine how this may be weaponized and
disarmed. Stone (2019) reported the use of Novichok nerve agent known as A-234 against former
Russian spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia Sergei Skripal, indicating that chemical and
biological weapons are still seen as means of adversarial acts for some nations (Stone, 2019). While
using biological and chemical agents for adversarial acts, Russia has also conducted misinformation
campaigns, as reflected in a report by the BBC on how Russian state media fabricates news about
a supposed death lab in Georgia (Goddard, 2018). The false accusations were investigated by the
BBC, and their investigation revealed that activities in a US-funded lab in Georgia to cure Hepatitis-C
were presented as biological warfare experiments; Russian media and officials made false claims
20

International Journal of Cyber Warfare and Terrorism
Volume 11 • Issue 3 • July-September 2021

about the laboratory’s activities and presented the funding from the DoD as evidence of biological
warfare experiments (Goddard, 2018). While the story was disproved, its use by the Russian media
serves as an instrument to consider the use of biological warfare, perhaps also related propaganda,
as an acceptable component of warfare. This phenomenon is expanded to other labs in Ex-Soviet
countries such as Kazakhstan, Georgia, Armenia, and more, which were part of a former anti-plague
system (Stronski, 2020). Stronski (2020) notes that these now-retrofitted labs, owed in part to the
Nunn-Lugar program, used for tracking outbreaks and plague prevention, were accused of harboring
and boosting bioweapons research, which damaged their reputation (Stronski, 2020). Considering
that the possibility of actors obscuring their tracks exists within BCS, as in cybersecurity, it would
not be an exaggeration to expect countries to use cyber methods to trigger biological consequences,
with difficulty in attribution. There exists an uncounted possibility of scenarios where such methods
may be deployed, although their trace may not appear for years. In the case of international terrorism,
malicious actors have more targets that can be pursued, and it is wise that a nation works to get as
much of a running start as possible in defense and forensics.
COVID-19 has proved to be a case where the expectations for complete cooperation against a
global pandemic failed, and waves of disinformation in the biological area were not curbed despite
the necessity to fight against a global pandemic. Disinformation and misinformation campaigns
already had a significant impact on public policy. (Landon-Murray. et al., 2019). There is little reason
to believe that these campaigns would have lost steam due to COVID-19 and are seen as valuable
enough to continue amid the pandemic. In July 2020, Associated Press reported from US officials
that such disinformation campaigns were used by Russia either to spread false news or to amplify
certain accusations from China to create confusion and advance certain narratives (Tucker, 2020).
This problem is not just limited to the East, as Nie (2020) reports; the spread of misinformation is a
wider phenomenon indicating an imperative for improved cooperation, communication, and trust in
helping to contain emergent threats within the misinformation sown (Nie, 2020).
THE CASE FOR “DEFEND FORWARD”
INTERNATIONALLY AND DOMESTICALLY
The shift in the approach of several western nations from a defensive to an offensive approach in
cybersecurity brings even more significance to the importance of BCS. (Smeets et al., 2018). France
and Germany recently adopted an offensive approach in cybersecurity (Laudrain, 2019; Schulze and
Herpig, 2018; Kavanagh, 2019). Traditionally, the European approach had always emphasized privacy,
tried to avoid government intervention, and was not inclined to offensive cyber operations (Tatar et al.,
2014). However, increasing activities of international actors, especially the “Paris Call for Trust and
Security in Cyberspace” by the end of 2018, which emerged as an initiative to establish international
norms for the internet, triggered new initiatives. (France Diplomatie:: Ministry for Europe and Foreign
Affairs, 2019). This was followed by a new doctrine by France, who initiated the Paris Call. In 2019,
France published its “Doctrine for Offensive Cyber Operations,” and cyber activities were integrated
into conventional military operations (Laudrain, 2019). Similarly, Germany’s preparations for a new
cyber defense strategy with components of offensive operations and changes to the German Basic
Law were reported in the media (Prager, 2019).
This trend is also seen in the US Department of Defense (DoD) through the DoD Cyber Strategy
(Mattis, 2018; Volz, 2019). This shift is reflected in the removals of restrictions in the Obama-era
Presidential Policy Directive 20 (PPD-20) and the publication of the recent DoD Cyber Strategy (Geller
& Schwartz, 2018). The concepts of “persistent engagement” and “defend forward” acknowledge
that there already is an ongoing war in cyberspace, and the DoD, which oversees securing the nation
from foreign adversaries, has the task of defending the nation in war; this task demands the use of
cyber capabilities in adversarial networks, within the authority granted to the US military by Title 10
(Kosseff, 2019). This trend can also be observed in the revision of the Joint Publication 3-12 in 2018.
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It is noted that 3-12 does not include the biological dimension and poorly talks about the cognitive
dimension. However, with the fact that possible attacks that include both dimensions have been
demonstrated to be possible, at least in lab environments, as shown through the work of Ney, Puzis,
and others, it is reasonable to update the document. (Ney, 2017; Puzis, 2020). Although the former
version of Joint Publication (JP) 3-12 was published in 2013, it has a very similar outline with JP
3-12 (2018), which expands further in the definition of cyberspace, and delineates core activities in
cyberspace. The definition of Offensive Cyberspace Operations (OCO) in the 2018 document refers
to “in and through “foreign” cyberspace” while the 2013 document mentions just “in and through
cyberspace.” This was also reflected in the fact that the US Cyber Command was elevated to a
unified combatant command in May 2018, which meant that the commander of the Cyber Command
would have the authority to act in the cyber domain similar to the actions other combatant command
commanders can take in war zones. While this approach is still problematic when considering US IP
addresses, within the scope of “foreign cyberspace,” taking the direct consequential effects of BCS
into account improves the justification of “defend forward” as a necessary strategy with bio-cyber
technological convergence as threats in this intersection can permeate US localized devices, locations,
and bodies connected to US IP addresses. (George 2019).
BCS AND LEGITIMACY OF “DEFEND FORWARD”
This legitimacy of the DF paradigm is more valid for the attacks threatening BCS due to a more
direct biological emphasis and a threat to life compared to common cyber-attacks which focus rather
on finances, privacy, or non-medical infrastructure; this reality puts cases of BCS at the margins
closest to armed conflict within the territory of “short of armed conflict” (Karabacak and Tatar,
2014). While every cyber attack has its unique consequences, the attacks within the scope of BCS
are categorically closer to life-threatening consequences as in an armed conflict. This certainly does
not negate the attribution problem within cybersecurity. Despite the support of countries that favor
defend forward, attribution is still a problem in cyberspace (Tatar, Gokce, and Gheorghe, 2017). It is
difficult to figure out whether the source of the attack is determined accurately, and this casts doubts
on legitimacy in any offensive action. While the attribution problem has a limiting effect on overall
cyber defense and any offensive cyber operations, it also supports the case for “defend forward”
when BCS is considered a critical component of overall security. Positioning in line with DF is more
justifiable in the context of BCS due to the greater need for attribution as biological elements can be
more precisely targeted and include a greater dimension for tracking, especially where the biological
interlock is defined. Regional sources of pandemics can more or less be triangulated. This context
can generate outcomes different from the negative public opinion in the post 9/11 world wherein the
US forces were positioned in the Middle East and became engaged in wars with the rationale that
uncertainty legitimized preemptive strikes (Amoore and De Goede, 2008). While this notion can and
has been criticized in terms of long-term consequences, it has a stronger relevance in a BCS setting
(Amoore and De Goede, 2008). Biocyber attacks, like those of nuclear attacks, could create problems
that remain and accumulate in our bodies and environments (Bromet et al., 2011; Shaul and Lower,
2015). Unlike the negative effects related to public perceptions due to the “preemptive strikes” in the
war on terror, positioning in cyberspace is not very clear and would not necessarily constitute a source
of negative public opinion. However, public opinion of current administrations could turn negative
upon failure to meet biological cyber threats regarding their effects if unaddressed. Reflecting on the
support for the military and anti-terror initiatives, an administration would do well to have a plan of
action to engage in such threats.
An important question is what form this engagement would take. Realistically, this means
improved funding towards STEM education, greater expertise sharing between labs focusing on
specialized areas of biology, promotion of initiatives that study the growing synergy between biology
and computing, updating best practices for the regulation of biological products, promotion of
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community bio spaces and allowing security forces to pursue agents who aim to use the intersection
for terror (George 2019; Murch et al. 2018; Potter & Palmer 2020). In all areas, this means growing
proactivity to keep up with the explosive growth of biocybertechnology, as well as educating society,
to allow for superior flexibility in navigating such threats. A policy that fails to do this runs the risk
of rapid obsolescence, waste, and expanding liabilities for the nation’s future.This concern has only
increased due to the cyberattacks on the healthcare systems during COVID-19. Prior to the pandemic,
Kruse et al. (2017) noted numerous modern healthcare threats already in existence that may grow.
A bipartisan letter from several US senators to the heads of the Department of Homeland Security’s
(DHS) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), National Security Agency, and
US Cyber Command was urging CISA and Cyber Command to “Evaluate further necessary action
to defend forward to detect and deter attempts to intrude, exploit, and interfere with the healthcare,
public health, and research sectors”(US Senate, 2020).
BCS AND DEFEND FORWARD AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL
In addition to the impact of BCS in strategic defense posture, it has immense potential to influence
future warfare through expanding the number of available and potential targets, with the potential
for off-target effects for both user and target. This entails a need to find ways to contain threats
before they start. In terms of biocyberwarfare, ISTAR (intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition,
and reconnaissance) activities become further complicated as more routes to attack enter into
the discussion. The US Joint Publication 3-12 “Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational
Environment” describes the information environment as “the aggregate of individuals, organizations,
and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information” and repeatedly indicates that
cyberspace is included in the information environment (Joint Publication 3-12 Cyberspace Operations,
2019). In a persistent engagement world, the investigation of malicious actors trying to penetrate
biotechnological assets and taking deterrent, preventive, or disruptive measures in their systems
becomes a natural component of operational planning. This allows us to revisit our earlier question
regarding DF from the context of BCS. In “positioning to degrade biocyber operations,” this can
mean gathering the general means to contain and dismantle operations by malicious actors through
ongoing research and preparation. The second means, which is to “gather information about threats
and inform defenses,” takes the form of surgically gathering adequate expertise to dynamically develop
risk assessments and methods of containment for specific threats. Lastly, the step of “influencing
adversaries to discourage them from deploying cyber operations against the United States” can be
through stiff penalties for low-level actors, leading up to sanctions and preemptive action against statelevel actors. The main difference in extending DF involves applying a deeper degree of consideration
for how biology can play a part in cyber operations and applying more expertise towards it.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS TOWARD A FUTURE
AND MORE COMPREHENSIVE WORK
This paper serves to discuss the topic of BCS and the implications of COVID-19 on BCS within
the context of DF. It first discusses the prominence of the emerging field of BCS and provides a
foundation for future argument as to why it needs to be considered as a critical component of cyber
warfare. There are three lines of BCS that make it a critical component of overall cyber defense within
the context of defending forward: (1) Cyber operations within the area of BCS have life-threatening
consequences to a greater extent than other cyber operations, (2) The breach in health-related personal
data is a significant tool for fatal attacks, and finally (3) Health-related misinformation campaigns
as a component of BCS can cause significant damage compared to other misinformation campaigns.
The notion is further supported by the observation that the fight against COVID-19 did not initiate
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the necessary cooperation, but on the contrary, exacerbated the existing conflicts. As the effects of
the pandemic threatened lives, the existing fear has been used for misinformation campaigns.
Following the discussion on the increasing importance of BCS and how this role has gained
prominence, the paper suggests that BCS needs to be considered as an essential component of the
cybersecurity doctrine within the Defending Forward framework. While key factors in the emergence
of BCS include the pace of improvements in biotechnology, the nature of attacks related to BCS,
potential attacks that may emerge, and the criticality of attribution in such attacks that could benefit
from a national security-based approach to BCS, the cases related to COVID-19 proved that BCS
serves as an amplifying factor for conflict in cyberspace and its spill to other domains of warfare. The
authors suggest that the experiences regarding the lack of cooperation in the COVID-19 environment
have served as a means to increase awareness about BCS and strengthened the arguments for the
defense forward approach within cybersecurity. The authors additionally suggest that BCS needs to
be considered as a critical component of national cybersecurity strategies and the incidents during
COVID-19 further exposed this necessity. The authors specifically encourage further research in the
inclusion of BCS concerning the assessment of national security.
Given the breadth of such a combined framework, the authors believe that such can be assisted
by an updated mapping of BCS research and cases of real-world exploits at the intersection that is
BCS. Combined with the latest Joint Publication, a more meaningful foundation for inclusion can be
established. It is the authors’ opinion that the endeavor towards a comprehensive BCS-DF framework
is in the best interests of national security for each nation.
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